The First National Plan to Protect the Poultry Industry in Iraq

 

 

Dr. Majid Hamid Al-Sayegh

27/ 10/ 2025

Proposed Official Framework for Controlling Diseases Transmitted Vertically Through Imported Hatching Eggs (Based on Recent Field Evidence in Iraq and Recommendations from Specialized International Organizations)

Official Introduction
In 2025, the Iraqi poultry industry faces a growing strategic threat that is not similar to the traditional threats associated with common respiratory diseases or poor farm management alone. Today, the threat begins before the farm, before the feed, and before the vaccine—it begins inside the egg itself. Iraqi and international veterinary sources have documented that some highly economically impacting pathogens, such as fowl adenovirus (FAO), particularly virulent strains such as FAdV-4, Mycoplasma gallisepticum and Mycoplasma synoviae, and Salmonella pullorum (Salmonella gallinarum), are not only transmitted horizontally between pens, but also vertically—from the parent flock to the fertilized egg and then to the chicks at hatching. This pattern of vertical transmission makes the fertilized egg (hatching egg) a potential entry point for the disease, rather than simply an animal production resource.

 

Recent data from Iraqi fields demonstrate that this is not an academic theory, but a costly reality:
Fowl Adenovirus (FAdV-4) and Pericardial Hydrops Syndrome/Hepatitis with Inclusions (HHS/IBH): Catastrophic mortality rates of up to 65% were recorded in broiler farms in southern Iraq during 2024 in a flock of approximately three weeks old, with typical anatomical lesions (hepatomegaly with necrotic lesions, viral inclusion bodies, and pericardial fluid accumulation (pericardial hydrops)). These cases were linked to highly pathogenic adenovirus strains FAdV-4, known worldwide for their ability to transmit vertically from the parent flock to the egg, with chicks hatching pre-infected. This scenario has also been documented in the Nineveh and Diyala regions since 2021–2022, confirming that the threat is no longer limited to a specific geographic area.

 

Respiratory Mycoplasma (Mycoplasma gallisepticum / M. synoviae):
Field laboratory analysis of broiler flocks in Samarra (samples from late 2022, results published in 2024) showed Mycoplasma gallisepticum prevalence rates exceeding 30% in flocks with respiratory illnesses. An Iraqi PCR study also showed Mycoplasma synoviae prevalence rates reaching approximately 55%, with a 35% incidence of double infection (MG + MS). These figures demonstrate that mycoplasma infection is not an isolated incident, but rather a widespread phenomenon affecting very young chicks, with symptoms including airsac inflammation, wheezing, tendonitis and arthritis, and growth inhibition. Mycoplasma is capable of vertical transmission through the egg, meaning that chicks can hatch already carrying chronic respiratory and joint infections.

Salmonella Pullorum / Salmonella Gallinarum (Pullorum and Fowl Typhoid):
In Babil Governorate, recent bacteriological and molecular studies have shown high rates of Salmonella isolation from local broiler chickens, with Salmonella pullorum confirmed using PCR techniques, with positive rates reaching more than 60% of tested samples in some series. This particular strain (S. pullorum) is the classic cause of pullorum disease in chicks, which manifests as “white diarrhea,” severe lethargy, abdominal bloating, and very early death. It is a strain known to be transmitted vertically from the mother to the egg, not just through litter contamination. The continued presence of Pullorum in the field in Iraq confirms that we are dealing with an old but living threat, not a dead end, as in some countries that have successfully eradicated it from parent flocks.

 

These facts carry significant political, technical, and economic significance:

First, this level of loss is not the loss of a single farm, but a national loss. When a vertically transmitted adenovirus (FAdV-4) causes 30%–65% mortality in a broiler flock less than a month old, this is not just a “farm disease.” This is a direct gap in national food security (poultry meat production), an increase in the cost per kilogram for the consumer, and a collapse in profitability for the breeder. This loss now falls on Iraqi breeders, not on the foreign egg supplier.

Second, these diseases in particular are beyond any subsequent attempt at control in the field. The breeder may sterilize, adhere to traditional vaccination, limit visits, and prevent the entry of contaminated feed trucks. However, if he receives chicks that were hatched carrying Mycoplasma respiratoryis, or chicks carrying Salmonella pullorum, or chicks carrying a lethal adenovirus strain, “on-farm biosecurity” becomes too late. The damage reached the field before the chicks entered it. This is the nature of vertical transmission, and therefore the FAO Good Practices Guidelines for Hatcheries consider it the first point of breaking the biological chain: either we prevent the infection from entering the egg, or we will spend it inside the country.

Third: Iraq already has sovereign tools to stop this, but it has not yet applied them to all vertical factors. The Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and official veterinary authorities have a strong regulatory precedent:

– Iraq prohibits the import of hatching eggs and day-old chicks from any US state during a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) outbreak, and does not lift the ban until 28 days after the official eradication and disinfection there. This is officially documented as an import condition.

– Iraq also already requires a prior import permit and an official veterinary health certificate issued by the government veterinary authority in the country of origin and certified by the Iraqi embassy prior to shipment, especially when importing hatching eggs and day-old chicks. This means that Iraq legally recognizes hatching eggs as a “high-risk commodity” and not a regular commodity.

These mechanisms exist. The question now is: Why don’t we expand these same authorities to include all vertical pathogens that threaten domestic poultry production—highly pathogenic adenovirus (FAdV-4, IBH/HHS), mycoplasma (MG/MS), and Salmonella pullorum/Gallinarum—rather than focusing solely on avian influenza?

What is required of decision-makers (the Ministry, Veterinary Quarantine, Customs Supervisory Authorities, and the Financial Control Bureau, if necessary) is clear:
1. Officially recognize that the “first cycle of national biosecurity” begins at the import gate of fertilized eggs, not just at the gates of local farms.
2. Issuing a unified national veterinary health certificate accompanying any shipment of imported hatching eggs, stating clearly and explicitly that the breeder flock in the country of origin is:
a. Free of high-risk vertical strains of adenovirus (FAdV-4 associated with pericardial hydrocephalus syndrome/IBH/HHS).
b. Free of commercially important mycoplasmas (Mycoplasma gallisepticum, Mycoplasma synoviae, and Mycoplasma meleagridis in turkeys), based on periodic serological and/or PCR tests under official veterinary supervision.
c- Free from Salmonella Pullorum/Fowl Typhoid, according to an official monitoring program equivalent to the internationally recognized “Pullorum-Typhoid Clean” programs, with documented test results.

Requiring incubators within Iraq to operate as veterinary quarantine gates, not just chick factories:
1- Separate “clean” areas (egg reception and sterilization) from “contaminated” areas (hatching and chick withdrawal).
2- Do not mix batches from different sources in the same hatchery before completing testing.
3- Samples of chick box lining, dead embryos, and down/dust in the hatching room should be taken and tested for Salmonella, Mycoplasma, and Adenovirus before chicks are allowed to be distributed to farms. This procedure is included in the FAO recommendations and the WOAH guidelines on hatchery-level monitoring and is considered a true early warning tool.
4- Keep a record of each batch (source, hatching results, early mortality rates, and any signs of head disease) for at least two years to ensure immediate traceability if a field problem arises. This approach is consistent with the logic of the European Union and international bodies: the hatchery is the legal traceability point.

Explicit financial liability:
If it is proven that a shipment of imported hatching eggs was vertically (horizontally) carrying a pathogen (a lethal adenovirus, mycoplasma, or salmonella pullorum), resulting in losses or widespread outbreaks in Iraq, the exporting supplier and local importer shall bear the costs of culling, disinfection, laboratory testing, and compensation.
This formula is not new; the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Iraq itself apply a similar logic when dealing with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) imports (suspending imports from endemic areas and holding the importer responsible in case of violation). This can simply be expanded to include vertical diseases.

This document is designed to be read by:
• Decision-makers (ministry, regulatory agencies).
• Veterinary authorities at border crossings.
• Commercial incubators.
• Field veterinarians.
• Breeders themselves.

The message is clear:
Iraq cannot continue to lose entire flocks within 2–4 weeks due to diseases that should have been prevented from entering the egg stage in the first place. Every uncontrolled hatching egg shipment is not a “production opportunity,” but rather a potential vector for a national disease ready to spread. Control begins here, with fertilized eggs, as the first link in national biosecurity.