A Comprehensive Comparative Review of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Challenges in South Africa and Iraq to 2025: Practical Applications for Enhancing Biosecurity and Developing Autologous Vaccines

 

Dr. Majed Hamed Al Saegh / Poultry Pathologist / Australia

9/ 7/ 2025

Introduction

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly contagious, epidemic animal disease that significantly impacts livestock health, food security, and international trade in animals and their products. The disease is classified as a notifiable disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OAHE) due to its transboundary impact. In 2025, outbreaks resurfaced strongly in several countries, most notably South Africa and Iraq. While South Africa implemented approved containment mechanisms, Iraq faced significant barriers to response and containment, highlighting the need to review veterinary and biosecurity policies in developing countries, highlighting the role of autologous vaccines as an alternative tool in areas where commercial vaccines are not effective.

 

Methodology

More than 15 official documents and recent scientific reports from 2025 were reviewed, including:

1. The South African Department of Agriculture.
2. Reports from the Iraqi Veterinary Operations Room.
3. Virus sequencing data from FAO and WRLFMD.
4. Reuters and gov.za data on vaccine availability and the impact of trade embargoes.

 

Key factors were compared, including outbreak size, virus strain, vaccine availability, biosecurity level, and the disease’s impact on the economy and livestock production.

 

Results

In South Africa, more than 200 outbreaks of FMD SAT2 were recorded during the first six months of 2025, including farms and open pasture areas. This led to the suspension of meat exports to China and several other countries. Emergency vaccination campaigns were launched, and an additional 900,000 vaccine doses were ordered.

In Iraq, nine confirmed outbreaks were reported, all due to the SAT1 strain (rare in the region), and at least 654 livestock deaths were recorded. Available vaccines were ineffective because they were specific to strains O and A. A local vaccination plan was not implemented, and vaccines prepared from circulating isolates were not available. Authorities relied on movement restrictions without direct vaccine intervention.

 

Discussion

These findings highlight a clear gap in response between the two countries. Despite challenges, South Africa implemented an integrated management system:

1. The presence of a livestock database.
2. The ability to issue early warnings and a flexible logistical response.
3. It also benefited from its ability to prepare self-vaccines through local facilities, using local virus isolates and preparing them under GMP conditions.

In contrast, Iraq lacks this level of preparedness; it does not have a national bank of FMD isolates and does not have facilities dedicated to preparing field vaccines, instead relying on limited imports of old vaccines. The weak implementation of veterinary tracking and control systems in markets, particularly in the Diyala, Karbala, and Nineveh regions, also contributed to delayed control.

Real-life examples: In KwaZulu-Natal, the infection was detected through tracking a cattle auction in Utrecht, and the herd was isolated after 48 hours. In contrast, in Diyala Governorate, Iraq, the first FMD case in a barn was not diagnosed until more than 60 cattle had developed symptoms, demonstrating a lack of early detection.

 

Conclusion

The analysis shows that FMD control depends not only on vaccine availability, but also on its suitability for the circulating strain and the availability of an integrated system of monitoring, diagnosis, quarantine, and biosecurity. South Africa succeeded in minimizing the impact, unlike Iraq, which suffered from poor diagnosis, delayed response, and the lack of effective field vaccines.

 

Recommendations

1. Establish a national bank of FMD isolates in Iraq to track local strains and update vaccination strategies. 2. Establish a local production line for self-administered vaccines in cooperation with academic institutions and national research centers.
2. Activate a national electronic livestock numbering system and link it to digital vaccination cards.
3. Adopt a “Zoning” policy in governorates with no recorded cases, to protect them and promote domestic exports.
4. Train 500 veterinarians in high-risk governorates on standard procedures for rapid response and prevention.
5. Coordinate with WOAH to assess national preparedness and provide technical support to develop local capacities.