A Comprehensive Paper on Combating Avian Influenza in Iraq

 

Dr. Majid Hamid Al-Saigh

12/12/2025

A comprehensive organizational position paper for combating avian influenza in Iraq, from general diagnosis to a binding, applicable, and measurable national framework.

(A Letter to Whom It May Concern)
The Iraqi Veterinary Medical Association – The Veterinary Authority/Ministry of Agriculture – The Ministry of Health – The Ministry of Environment – ​​Poultry Producers’ Unions – Hatchery Administrations – Relevant Regulatory Bodies.

Greetings,

With reference to the statement issued by the Veterinary Syndicate regarding the recorded cases of avian influenza and the resulting economic losses and direct threat to food security, we present this paper as a rigorous regulatory expansion that transforms the points raised in the statement from a descriptive level to an executive legislative level, in line with global practices based on international animal health standards and risk management guidelines across the entire production chain.

First: The Core of the Problem: A Systemic Crisis, Not Just a Virus Crisis
Avian influenza in Iraq is not spreading due to a lack of knowledge about the disease, but rather due to the fragility of the control system across the production and marketing chains. Any approach that does not address these chains together will reproduce the crisis every season:

1. Biosecurity based on an unregulated, unmeasured, and unaccountable approach.

2. Movement of birds, equipment, and transport without strict official protocols.

3. A fragmented vaccine market without a unified national policy.

4. Widespread and uncontrolled use of antibiotics, which confuses diagnosis, weakens immunity, and exacerbates losses.

5. Live bird markets that act as epidemiological amplification points. 6. Unsafe traditional methods of disposing of bodies and mattresses.

7. The absence of a compensation system that encourages early reporting and prevents the shadow economy.

 

Second: The Most Impactful Gaps in Iraq (In-Depth Explanation of the Statement Points).

1- The “End-of-Cycle Birds” Gap as a National Vector of Infection.

One of the most dangerous links in the spread of disease in Iraq is the sale of (breeders, laying hens, and end-of-cycle flocks) by itinerant traders or in live markets without inspection, quarantine, or documentation of movement. This practice transforms the end-of-cycle flock into a mobile infection bridge connecting governorates and reigniting outbreaks, even if some farms adhere to sound procedures within their premises.

The global principle here is clear: controlling movement is a key condition for successful containment. Countries that have eased the pressure of outbreaks have tightened restrictions on the movement of high-risk flocks and linked them to permits, inspection, and official transport routes.

Required Action:

• Prohibit the transport/sale of end-of-cycle birds except with documented veterinary inspection, an official transport route, and direct delivery to licensed slaughterhouses.

• Prohibit their use as a basis for breeding or marketing through unregulated channels.

2- The Live Bird Market, Transport, and Cage Gap.

Live bird markets globally are an ideal environment for multiple sources of the virus to mix and amplify. Experiences in countries like Hong Kong have shown that market regulation policies (prohibiting birds from staying overnight within markets, mandating cleaning days, and requiring closures) can significantly reduce the viral load. Furthermore, implementing strict systems for cage and truck movement and mandatory disinfection changes the outbreak curve when applied as part of a comprehensive system, not as a mere formality.

Required Action: • Officially register every live bird market.

• Impose mandatory closure days for cleaning and disinfection.

• Prohibit overnight stays during periods of high risk.

• Conduct regular environmental swabs of cages, trucks, and collection points.